Recently in discussion a friend of mine brought up the fact that all of the arguments for the existence of God, are good, but only get you to a sort of Platonic Form of the Good. A metaphysically necessary, first cause, moral ground of the universe. He then said that this object could be impersonal, and so they are not good arguments for Theism.
While I certainly believe that God is a person I will admit I was a bit stumped here, if only for sheer surprise, Normally I have people reject premises or just get annoyed, but this did seem like a semi-solid objection. The Contingency Argument got you back to a Metaphysically Necessary thing, the argument for Objective Morality got you to a Platonic Object of the Good, and the Cosmological Argument from Absolute beginning got you back to a Timeless, spaceless, immaterial, thing. The only one I knew that could definitely prove personhood was the Telelogical argument, assuming it went through successfully.
After a bit of reflection though, it occurred to me that this is false. All of them refer back to a Personality. We will take each argument one at a time and show how.
The Moral Argument.:
1. If God does not exist objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective Moral Values exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
First, let us define objective morality. Objective morality is the state of affairs in which for any situation x, there is a moral thing to do.1 But what do we mean by ‘moral’? Morality seems to be rooted in the idea of persons: The Oxford Dictionary2 has as their first definition for the adjective moral as:
Concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character:
and Merriam-Webster has three:
: concerning or relating to what is right and wrong in human behavior
: based on what you think is right and good
“Apparently, Kant’s Principle of Humanity, as it appeared in the empyrean and before the foundation of the world, read, ‘Should, against all probability, there be stars, and should, also improbably, those stars align in such a way as to permit the emergence of life, and should, against overwhelming odds, some of those living things turn out to be ‘human’, then they are to be treated as ends-in-themselves and never as means to an ends, and this even in the event that the contingencies of evolution direct them to think otherwise. Disregard this directive in those universes in which these conditions fail to obtain.” (Mark Linville: The Moral Argument, The Blackwell Companion for Natural Theology)
And the reason for that brings us nicely into our second argument.
The Argument from The Absolute Beginning
Simply put the argument from the Beginning of the Universe goes like this:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The Universe began to exist.
3. The Universe has a cause.
The cause of the spatio-temporal-material universe could not have been anything spatio-temporal-material, which leads to a non-spatio-temporal-material thing that caused the universe.3 The problem with this, is that there are only a scant few things which could be immaterial/spaceless/timeless, and those things are ‘abstract objects’ and ‘unembodied minds’.
Abstract objects would include things like numbers, shapes, universals, propositions, and so on and so forth. The problem is however, that all of them are causally impotent. They bear no causal relationships to anything. The number seven does not cause anything, but seven objects might. This is the problem with the above statement of Kant’s Moral Principle. As a principle, it stands in causal impotence with the world unless the world happened to be aligned to it, or else was aligned to it by a mind, then it seems implausible to think it shapes the morality in the universe.
This leads us then to a cause of the universe that is an Unembodied Mind. Minds in most cases are regarded as persons, persons here being something with will and knowledge, and power. (The ability to make a decision, know the decision, and execute the decision.) Or else we have a universe that is contingently aligned with principles and propositions.
The Contingency Argument:
1. Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then that explanation is God.
3. The Universe exists.
4. Therefore the Universe has an explanation of its existence. (Modus Ponens, 1,3)
5. Therefore the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. (Modus Ponens, 2, 4)
Assuming that the argument goes through we wind up with an explanation of the universe that is God. 2) seems at first blush to be an unfounded assertion, but lets pick it apart a bit. If the Universe is taken to be all of material-temporal-spatial reality, then that would include anything material-temporal-spatial that could exist. Therefore the explanation of the universe has to be in something timeless, immaterial, and spaceless. This thing, which we established cannot be an abstract object without itself being contingently aligned (though not necessarily contingently existent) with the universe, must therefore be an unembodied mind. Which is a being with will and knowledge and power, which is a person. And an unembodied mind that is spaceless, timeless, and immaterial is what everyone means by God.
So we can conclude that the personhood of God is deducible from these arguments when you really begin to ponder them. There are some arguments that might go to show that he’s multi-personal, but these require theological assumptions and could belabor a whole post by themselves. We do know however, that if these arguments go through, we have a timeless, spaceless, powerful, willing, personal being, who is also immaterial, who is the source of the universe and the cause of the universe, as well as the being who is good enough to be the grounding of all our moral values. Which sounds a lot like God to me.
- This allows you to deal with difficult situations. While “It is wrong to lie” is a general absolute, when you have Nazis banging on your door it may not be okay to follow. But there is nonetheless a ‘right’ thing to do in this situation. This is not to suggest situation ethics, where it may be okay to slaughter little children if it brings around a good result or if the situation requires it. That would imply that there are relative morals that change depending on the circumstance. ↩
- http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/moral ↩
- Cause here is being used in the sense of ‘efficient’ cause, not ‘material’ cause. ↩